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Textualism Today:
Scalia’s Legacy and His Lasting
Philosophy
CHASE WATHEN *
Appointed to the Supreme Court in 1986 by President
Reagan, Justice Antonin Scalia redefined the philosophy of
textualism. Although methods like the plain meaning rule
had been around for over a century, the textualist philosophy
of today was not mainstream. While Scalia’s textualism is
thought to be a conservative philosophy, Scalia consistently
maintained that it was judicial restraint rather than conservatism at the heart of his method. The key tenant of Scalia’s
new textualism was an outright rejection of legislative history, which he often brought up in opinions only to mock and
dismiss as irrelevant. Starting with the hypothesis that
Scalia’s textualism is alive and well, being used more frequently since his passing than the four years prior, this Article seeks to measure the lasting impact of his philosophy in
the federal appellate courts. In particular, this paper
measures how often courts of appeals cited to legislative history in the years before Scalia’s passing and how often they
have in the years since. The Article also seeks to measure the
correlation between textualism and the political right-wing
by sorting citations to legislative history by appointing President over the past three years. The tested hypothesis is that
Bush and Clinton appointees are likely to be more moderate,
citing legislative history more frequently than Trump and
*
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Reagan appointees, but far less frequently than Obama appointees. Using a dataset that includes all published federal
appellate court opinions between June 1, 2011, and November 30, 2020, for the first hypothesis the data revealed that
Scalia’s new textualism is being used more frequently in the
period after his death than in the period before. Of the thirteen federal circuits, eleven made fewer citations in the period after Scalia’s passing. For the second hypothesis,
counting all published federal appellate opinions between
December 1, 2017, and November 30, 2020, the data show
that judges appointed by Republican presidents are far less
likely to cite legislative history than Democrat appointees.
As expected, judges appointed by President Trump were the
least likely to cite to legislative history, but appointees of
President Clinton and not President Obama were the most
likely to cite to legislative history. Even if textualism may not
reliably produce conservative outcomes, it does seem as
though the conventional wisdom associating textualism with
the Republican party is well-founded.
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INTRODUCTION
Textualism means you are governed by the text. That
is the only thing that is relevant to your decision, not
whether the outcome is desirable, not whether legislative history says this or that. But the text of the statute.
— Antonin Scalia 1
There is little argument that the use of legislative history is a
controversial topic in the field of statutory interpretation. 2 The battle
between the plain meaning rule versus a more intentionalist approach had gone on for decades, 3 but was set on fire during the
1980’s. With the appointment of then Judge Antonin Scalia to the
Supreme Court, it became clear that this battle would not end anytime soon. 4
Scalia brought to the Court what some have called “the new textualism,” its defining feature being the total rejection of legislative
history as “irrelevant.” 5 The methodology gained momentum
throughout the 1980’s as Reagan appointees began to fill the
benches. 6 By the late 1980’s, the Supreme Court became much
warmer to the idea of rejecting legislative history wholesale, due in
no small part to Scalia. 7 His influence has been so strong that even
a more liberal Justice like Elena Kagan recently said, “I think we’re
all textualists now in a way that just was not remotely true when

Fox News Sunday, Supreme Court Justice Scalia Sits Down with Chris
Wallace, FOX NEWS, at 1:07 (July 29, 2012), https://video.foxnews.com/v/
1760716797001#sp=show-clips.
2
See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Kristen M. Renberg, The Paradoxical Impact of Scalia’s Campaign against Legislative History, 105 CORNELL L. REV.,
1023, 1026 (2020).
3
William J. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 623
(1989–90).
4
See id. at 623–24, 641.
5
See id at 623.
6
See Benjamin & Renberg, supra note 2, at 1028 (where the authors use the
Reagan era as a turning point in measuring the influence of textualism).
7
Eskridge, supra note 3, at 625.
1
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Justice Scalia joined the bench.” 8 Today, virtually all judges, regardless of their own approach to statutory interpretation, at least start
with the text, even if they do not end with it. 9
Although the Supreme Court had applied some version of the
plain meaning rule for over a century, 10 prior to the rise of Scalia,
conflicts between the plain meaning of the text and surrounding context were resolved by consulting the statute’s legislative history.11
To put it mildly, Justice Scalia was no fan of this approach. Although likely drawing initial inspiration from the plain meaning rule,
the “new textualism” of Scalia was far more constrained. 12 He was
not shy, even in his early years on the Court, to write controversial
opinions in adherence to his textualist philosophy.13 In just his second year on the Court, he wrote a contentious concurrence in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca where he
agreed with the Court’s conclusion, but rejected all reliance on legislative history, making clear that he would not attempt to discern
the intent of the legislature. 14
Today, a war once fought primarily in judicial opinions and law
review articles is now being waged in the pages of the New York
Times and Wall Street Journal, 15 and each Senate confirmation hearing for Supreme Court nominees seemingly grows more hostile than

Harv. L. Today, The 2015 Scalia Lecture: A Dialogue with Justice Elena
Kagan on the Reading of Statutes, YOUTUBE, at 7:58 (Nov. 17, 2015), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=dpEtszFT0Tg&feature=emb_logo [hereinafter
Scalia Lecture].
9
Id.
10
See William S. Blatt, The History of Statutory Interpretation: A Study in
Form and Substance, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 799, 812 (1985).
11
Eskridge, supra note 3, at 621.
12
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 499 (6th ed. 2020).
13
See, e.g., Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480
U.S. 421 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
14
Id. at 452–53.
15
Emily Bazelon, How Will Trump’s Supreme Court Remake America?,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/27/magazine/how-will-trumps-supreme-court-remake-america.html; Editorial, The Supreme Court’s Textualism Test, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 21, 2019, 7:21 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-supreme-courts-textualism-test-11574382080.
8
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the last. 16 While Scalia presented textualism as a politically neutral
philosophy rooted in judicial restraint, 17 others have dedicated entire
law review articles to its inherent immorality.18 Textualism is
widely regarded as a politically conservative approach to statutory
interpretation. 19 Perhaps this is because textualism inherently narrows statutes in a way that other approaches do not, resulting in less
government involvement. 20 Some contend that textualism’s association with the conservative movement is due in part to historical
happenstance. 21 As a reaction to the Warren and Burger courts issuing many intentionalist and purposivist decisions, which yielded results conservatives disliked, conservatives turned to textualism as a
cure. 22 Whatever its true origins, there is virtually no debate that the
textualist methodology is very closely tied to political conservativism—liberals regularly denounce it while Republican politicians
pay lip-service to its virtues. 23
This Article seeks to measure just how close the ties between
conservatism and textualism really are, and whether Scalia’s influence has waned more than four years since his passing in 2016.24
Two hypotheses are tested: (1) whether federal appellate courts, broken down by circuit, are more or less likely to cite legislative history
in the period since Scalia’s death than in the period preceding it; and
(2) whether willingness to cite legislative history varies by
Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux, Why The Supreme Court’s Reputation is at
Stake, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (OCT. 12, 2020), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/why-the-supreme-courts-reputation-is-at-stake/.
17
ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 16–17 (2012).
18
See generally Andrei Marmor, The Immorality of Textualism, 38 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 2063 (2005).
19
See Frank H. Easterbrook, Judicial Discretion in Statutory Interpretation,
57 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 18–19 (2004).
20
Benjamin & Renberg, supra note 2, at 1044.
21
See Margaret H. Lemos, The Politics of Statutory Interpretation, 89 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 849, 850 (2013).
22
Id.
23
See generally Marmor, supra note 18; See Emily Czachor, Ted Cruz Spars
with Pete Buttigieg Over Meaning of Constitutional Originalism, NEWSWEEK
(Oct. 20, 2020), https://www.newsweek.com/ted-cruz-spars-pete-buttigieg-overmeaning-constitutional-originalism-1540617.
24
Antonin Scalia, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/justices/antonin_scalia (last
visited Feb. 4, 2021).
16
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appointing President. To measure the first hypothesis, the number
of citations to legislative history in all published federal appellate
court opinions between June 2011 and February 2016 were recorded
and then compared to the frequency of citations between March
2016 and November 2020. 25 A much higher number of citations to
legislative history in the second period will indicate that Scalia’s influence is already fading while a similar or lower number than the
first period will indicate a strong and continuing legacy. To test textualism’s conservative reputation, the frequency of citations to legislative history will be used as a measure, but because citations are
measured by appointing President, the period between December
2017 and November 2020 will be used to account for more recent
appointees of former President Trump. The expectation is that Republican appointees as a whole will cite less frequently than their
Democrat counterparts. 26
For the first hypothesis, the data revealed that Scalia’s disdain
for legislative history is still influential in the thirteen Courts of Appeals, with all but two circuits citing less frequently in the four years
since his passing. 27 For the second hypothesis, the data showed a
clear ideological skew. 28 Republican appointees cite legislative history far less frequently than Democrat appointees. 29 Trump appointees were the least likely to cite to legislative history; in fact, they
cited three times fewer than Clinton appointees, who cited most often. 30
Part I of this article gives an overview of the history of textualism, walks through its evolution, and discusses why textualism has
such close ties to the conservative movement. Part II lays out the
hypotheses being tested and offers support for their validity. Part III
outlines the data and measures used to test those hypotheses. Part IV
presents the results of the study and their implications for the future.
Scalia’s influence is most strong with Trump appointees, and
given that those judges are the most recent appointees as well as the
Each period being four years and nine months.
See John Green, The Ideology of Trump’s Judges, DEMAND JUSTICE (Jan.
2019), https://demandjustice.org/reports/ideology-of-trump-judges/ (where a
study measured the ideology of judicial appointments by President).
27
See infra Part V.
28
See infra Part V.
29
See infra Part V.
30
See infra Part V.
25
26
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youngest in age, it seems unlikely that textualism will fade anytime
soon. There is an obvious ideological component to textualism,
however, Obama appointees were less likely to cite to legislative
history than Clinton appointees even though President Obama is
seen as further left politically than President Clinton. 31 This suggests
that Scalia has had an impact that crosses political lines and that
maybe, regardless of party, “we’re all textualists now.” 32
I.

HISTORY AND CONTROVERSY OF THE NEW TEXTUALISM
A.

The Rise of The New Textualism

Traditionally, the Supreme Court attempted to interpret statutes
in such a way that would give them an effect that was consistent
with the original intent or purpose of the enacting Congress. 33 In
pursuit of this goal, the Court would regularly consult the legislative
record to try and discern just what Congress’s intent was. 34 Although the statutory text was important as evidence of intent, it was
not dispositive.35 Legislative history was almost always consulted
to either affirm or rebut the plain meaning; 36 the end result being
that the text itself was often defeated by legislative history that came
into conflict with its ordinary meaning. 37
The best illustration of this “soft plain meaning rule” comes
from Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States. 38 In this case, the
plain language of the statute clearly banned the importation of alien
workers to come and work in the United States. 39 Although there
were exceptions to this prohibition, the statute did not exempt clergy
Peter Beinart, Why America is Moving Left, ATLANTIC (Feb. 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/01/why-america-is-moving-left/419112/.
32
Scalia Lecture, supra note 8.
33
Eskridge, supra note 3, at 626.
34
Id.
35
See Benjamin & Renberg, supra note 2, at 1028, 1032.
36
Eskridge, supra note 3, at 626.
37
See generally Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457
(1892); United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
38
See Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 459.
39
Id at 458.
31
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members. 40 When the church hired and paid for the transportation
of an English clergyman to come work for it in the United States,
the issue made it all the way up to the Supreme Court. 41 The Court
held that although clergy members fell “within the letter of the statute” the overall spirit of the statute mandated their exemption from
the prohibition. 42 For support, the Court relied heavily on a committee report that suggested the statute meant only to include manual
labor. 43 This approach grew in popularity over time and nearly 100
years later became the most common methodology used by the Supreme Court in the early 1980’s. 44
Another flavor of this methodology includes imaginative reconstruction. 45 This approach seeks to gather as much information
about the history of the statute as possible, including all forms of
legislative history, and tries to imagine what the enacting congress
would have thought about the issue in the given case. 46 Sometimes,
the Court even considers statements from individuals outside of the
legislature, such as executive agencies and private lobbyist groups
who often helped draft the legislation. 47 Although it did give more
weight to certain forms of legislative history, 48 prior to the rise of
the new textualism, the Court had no qualms about considering virtually anything in trying to figure out what the intent of the legislature was. 49 In one case, the Court went as far to say that because the
legislative history was unclear, it now had to turn to the text of the
statute to ascertain the legislative intent. 50 Even though the Court
40

See id.
Id.
42
See id. at 459.
43
See id. at 464.
44
Nicholas R. Parrillo, Leviathan and Interpretive Revolution: The Administrative State, The Judiciary, and the Rise of Legislative History, 1890–1950, 123
YALE L.J. 266, 269 (2013).
45
Eskridge, supra note 3, at 630.
46
Id.
47
Id. at 632–33. Note that these theories are still used today, though less frequently. Id.
48
See O’Brien v. United States, 391 U.S. 367, 385 (1968).
49
Eskridge, supra note 3, at 626.
50
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 412 n.29 (1971)
(“The legislative history . . . is ambiguous . . . .Because of this ambiguity it is
clear that we must look primarily to the statutes themselves to find the legislative
intent.”).
41
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commonly practiced this methodology for decades, the frequency of
citations to legislative history increased exponentially sometime
around 1970. 51 By 1982, one article concluded that it was safe to
“assume now, that the doubts and vacillations of the past in the adequate use of legislative history have vanished.” 52
Beginning in the early 1980’s, the traditional theory 53 was
brought into question and faced enormous criticism. 54 Skeptics began to question the underlying goal of the traditional approach itself. 55 Are judges actually supposed to try and figure out what the
legislature intended? Some argued that the use of legislative history
conflicted with the structure of the constitution itself. 56 Others contended that ascertaining a collective intent of a group of 535 legislators split into different houses is simply unrealistic. 57 Further degrading the theory’s credibility was the obvious reality that two
judges often look at the same legislative history and reach different
conclusions about its application to the facts of the given case. 58 Although Justice Scalia was not the first, nor the only one to reject the
traditional methodology, 59 his appointment to the Supreme Court in
1986 certainly made him the most prominent.
First and foremost, Scalia objected to the use of legislative history on constitutional grounds. 60 He believed the Constitution prohibited the use of legislative history, and he argued that searching

Benjamin & Renberg, supra note 2, at 1030–31.
Id. at 1031 (citing Jorge L. Carro & Andrew R. Brann, The U.S. Supreme
Court and the Use of Legislative Histories: A Statistical Analysis, 22 JURIMETRICS
294, 296–97 (1982)).
53
This method is widely known as the “Legal Process” theory. See Eskridge,
supra note 12, at 424–31.
54
Eskridge, supra note 3, at 641.
55
Id. at 642–649.
56
Kenneth W. Starr, Observations about the Use of Legislative History, 1987
DUKE L.J. 371, 375–76 (1987).
57
Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 547
(1983) (“Although legislators have individual lists of desires, priorities, and preferences, it turns out to be difficult, sometimes impossible, to aggregate these lists
into a coherent collective choice.”).
58
Eskridge, supra note 3, at 646, 648.
59
Benjamin & Renberg, supra note 2, at 1030–31.
60
Eskridge, supra note 12, at 512 (summarizing portions of Scalia’s A Matter
of Interpretation).
51
52
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for legislative intent in the first place is “anti-democratic.” 61 According to Scalia, the Constitution charges the judicial branch with
simply interpreting the laws with no mention of legislative intent.62
In a democracy, “it is the law that governs, not the intent of the lawgiver.” 63 Other advocates of this formalist critique maintained that
Article I itself assumes that the text rather than the legislative intent
governs, because Article I requires that any law be passed by both
houses and then be presented to the President for signature. 64 This
suggests that the use of legislative history violates that requirement
by giving more weight to the “intent” of some legislators, and less
to that of others. 65 Further, in cases where the statute was passed
with the signature of the President, reliance on such legislative history fails to take into account the importance of the executive’s role
in the lawmaking process. 66
Scalia often wrote scathing concurrences and dissents that condemned and even scoffed at the majority’s various uses of legislative
history. 67 Questions of statutory interpretation were often very technical, and he felt that few legislators voted with such “minute details” in mind.68 In any case, he felt it impossible to determine the
collective intent of such a large group because different legislators
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 9–14 (1997).
Id.
63
Id. at 17.
64
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFF. OF LEGAL POLICY, USING AND MISUSING
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: A RE-EVALUATION OF THE STATUS OF LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 26 (1989); U.S. CONST. art. I § 7.
65
Starr, supra note 56, at 376 (“In using legislative materials, the courts create winners and losers in the legislative process: elevating the views of some and
denigrating or rejecting the views of others.”).
66
Id. (“In carrying out his constitutionally ordained functions, the President
passes upon legislation, and as a practical matter does so without the benefit of
legislative history. In this regard, the President’s view of the statute may be different from that of the Congress, and from the subsequent interpretation rendered
by the courts. Judicial interpolation of the statute based upon legislative materials
thus has the potential to create a statute that the President would not have
signed.”).
67
See, e.g., Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480
U.S. 421 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring); Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 410
(1991) (“On that hypothesis, the fan-elected members of the baseball all-star
teams are “representatives”—hardly a common, if even a permissible, usage.”).
68
See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia,
J., Concurrence).
61
62
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may have voted on the bill for different reasons. 69 Even if one
wanted to discern legislative intent, things like conference and committee reports are poor guides because they come out of small legislative subgroups and are often polluted by interest groups, in the
end failing to represent any true collective intent. 70 Moreover, as the
judicial use of legislative history became more common over time,
legislators often mischievously added things to the record knowing
that at some point, a court may rely on it and produce a result in line
with the legislator’s own policy goals. 71 In short, Scalia thought that
legislative history is unreliable and unreflective of the intent of the
legislature as a whole or even in part. 72 The only way to know what
both houses and the President actually agreed on is to look at the
ordinary meaning of the text. 73 It is not the job of a judge to interpret
the “unexpressed intent” of the legislature, and “if they meant up
when they said down, that is their problem.” 74
Perhaps Justice Scalia’s most staunch critique was that the old
method was a justification for judges to simply remake the statute in
their own preferred image. 75 This has the effect of distorting the
proper separation of powers between the branches because it is the
legislature who is charged with making decisions about public
See Hoover Inst., Uncommon Knowledge: Antonin Scalia, YOUTUBE, at
17:25 (Oct. 30, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DaoLMW5AF4Y.
70
See Hirschey v. FERC, 777 F.2d 1, 8 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, Circuit
J., concurring) (citing a committee report in which the chair of the committee
himself admitted he did not read the report).
71
SCALIA, supra note 61, at 34. Scalia stated:
Some representatives would find it in their interest to plant misleading evidence. . . . Nowadays, however, when it is universally known and expected that judges will resort to floor debates
and (especially) committee reports as authoritative expressions
of ‘legislative intent,’ affecting the courts rather than informing
the Congress has become the primary purpose of the exercise . . . .Indeed, the more courts have relied on legislative history, the less reliable it has become!
Id. at 34.
72
Hoover Inst., supra note 69, at 17:20.
73
See Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 191–92 (1988) (Scalia, J., Concurrence).
74
Hoover Inst., supra note 69, at 17:18.
75
ANTONIN SCALIA: MEMORIAL TRIBUTES IN THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED
STATES, S. Doc. No. 114-12, at 14 (2017).
69
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policy, not the judiciary. 76 Selective use of a law’s legislative history, however, allows judges to find support for what they want the
statute to say. 77 Scalia reasoned that “your best shot at figuring out
what the legislature meant is to ask yourself what a wise and intelligent person should have meant; and that will surely bring you to the
conclusion that that the law means what you think it ought to
mean.” 78 In the words of another judge, looking to legislative history
is like “looking over a crowd and picking out your friends.” 79 Sometimes the legislative history points in two directions, leaving judges
in the position of determining whose intent to elevate over another
and inviting them to choose their own preferred outcome. 80
One such example is found in the case of Chisom v. Roemer. 81
The case dealt with the application of the 1982 amendments to Section Two of the Voting Rights Act on judicial elections. 82 The fight
turned on the meaning of the phrase: “to participate in the political
process and to elect representatives of their choice.” 83 This was a
change from the original language adopted in 1965 that clearly included all elections. 84 Justice Stevens, in writing for the majority,
looked at the larger policy goal of the statute and determined that
the use of the term “representatives” could not be construed to exclude judicial elections, and that, in context, the word describes the
winners of popular elections. 85 Under this construction, judicial
elections fell within the purview of the statute. 86 Stevens looked to
the evolution of the statute over time and noted that although the
language had changed, nothing in the legislative history suggested
that Congress wanted to exclude judicial elections in its latest update. 87 Considering the legislative history as a whole, Stevens drew
Eskridge, supra note 3, at 648.
See SCALIA, supra note 61, at 18.
78
Id.
79
Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in
the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 214 (1983).
80
Eskridge, supra note 3, at 642.
81
Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 410 (1991).
82
Id at 384.
83
Id. at 388–89.
84
Id at 390.
85
Id. at 403–04.
86
Id.
87
Id. at 396. “If Congress had such an intent, Congress would have made it
explicit in the statute, or at least some of the Members would have identified or
76
77
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from it a belief that Congress intended to broaden the scope of the
statute. 88 Scalia dissented, arguing, “[w]e are here to apply the statute, not legislative history, and certainly not the absence of legislative history.” 89 Acknowledging that it was possible to interpret “representatives” to include judges, the ordinary meaning obviously did
not go so broad. 90 Never one to suppress his feelings in arcane or
abstruse language, Scalia overtly accused the majority of starting
with its own assumption that Congress could not have meant to exclude judicial elections. Justice Stevens then simply found a way to
interpret the statute to reaffirm that assumption through consideration of legislative history. 91
Scalia’s textualist approach offered an alternative to decisions
like Chisom. By restraining the analysis to only the text, judges
would be limited in their ability to avoid its clear mandates, while at
the same time making the process simpler and less expensive. 92 Offering his own analysis of Holy Trinity, Scalia said that “the act was
within the letter of the statute, and was therefore within the statute:
end of case.” 93 In his Chisom dissent, Scalia contended that a judge’s
primary responsibility in the area of statutory interpretation is to
maintain consistency so that Congress is able to effectively draft
legislation to implement the will of their constituents. 94 The best
way to fulfill that responsibility is to interpret the terms in the text
in accordance with their ordinary meaning. 95 Interpreting a text in
accordance with its ordinary meaning does not mean strict construction, although, Scalia was often caricatured as a strict
mentioned it at some point in the unusually extensive legislative history of the
1982 amendment.” Id. This phenomenon is commonly likened to a Sherlock
Holmes novel in which Holmes solved a case by noticing that a dog did not bark.
Courts have often concluded that legislative silence on something that would constitute a major change indicates that it had no intention of making such a change.
See id. at 396 n.23.
88
Id. at 404.
89
Id. at 406 (referring again to the Sherlock Holmes theory of the dog that
did not bark).
90
Id. at 410.
91
See id. at 405.
92
Eskridge, supra note 3, at 656.
93
SCALIA, supra note 61, at 20.
94
Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 417 (1991).
95
See id.
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constructionist. 96 The text should be construed reasonably. 97 Accordingly, Scalia made use of many judicial canons of construction. 98 He acknowledged that his method was not perfect and did not
offer an easy solution to every case, but contended that it was however, the least imperfect. 99
After nearly thirty years of Scalia being on the Court, his philosophy became very popular and its use became common in the federal judiciary. 100 Due to his slot on the Supreme Court, Scalia remained textualism’s ideological leader up until the time of his death,
and as Justice Kagan observed in the earlier quote, his impact is hard
to overstate. 101 At the same time, few have questioned or opined
about what Scalia’s death means going forward in the area of statutory interpretation. Of the few who have, there is disagreement on
what his continuing influence will look like. Some predict that the
influence of Scalia will fade and textualism will slowly recede into
the shadows. 102 Others do not see the sun setting on textualism anytime soon due to Scalia’s influence on the legal profession and the
thousands of lawyers who received their legal education at the
height of his popularity. 103 Given that there is no methodological
stare decisis in the federal court system, 104 an empirical analysis of
the federal Courts of Appeals use of legislative history over the past
decade will provide some proxy for the ongoing influence Scalia
continues to have on the profession. 105

SCALIA, supra note 61, at 23 (“Textualism should not be confused with socalled strict constructionism, a degraded form of textualism that brings the whole
philosophy into dispute.”).
97
Id.
98
Id. at 28–29.
99
See Hoover Inst., supra note 69, at 38:15.
100
See J.T. Hutchens, A New Textualism: Why Textualists Should not be
Originalists, 16 KAN. J.L & PUB. POL’Y 108 (2007).
101
See Scalia Lecture, supra note 8.
102
See, e.g., Jonathan R. Siegel, The Legacy of Justice Scalia and His Textualist Ideal, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 857, 915 (2017).
103
See, e.g., William H. Pryor, Jr., Textualism after Antonin Scalia: A Tribute
to the Late Great Justice, 8 FAULKNER L. REV. 29, 46–47 (2016).
104
Lemos, supra note 21, at 856, 905.
105
See infra Part V.
96
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B.
Textualism and the Conservative Movement
Justice Antonin Scalia was nominated and confirmed to the
United States Supreme Court by the Senate with a unanimous vote
in 1986. 106 Since that time, the confirmation process has radically
changed. Beginning in 1988 with the hearings of Judge Robert Bork,
a Reagan nominee who the Senate confirmed unanimously to the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia less than six years
earlier, 107 a trend began where the confirmation process grew increasingly hostile to judges viewed as ideologically conservative. 108
Although some may dispute the claim that ideology was at the center
of what became an absolute spectacle in the cases of Judge Bork and
later Justices Clarence Thomas and Brett Kavanaugh, it is worth recognizing that all three are perceived to be right-wing. 109 Closely associated with Justices Thomas and Kavanaugh is the philosophy of
textualism. 110 Even in the more recent hearings to confirm Justice
Amy Coney Barrett, her judicial philosophy was at the center of a
controversy. 111 It is important to note the distinction between Constitutional and statutory interpretation, and that many quarrels with
106
UNITED STATES SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/legislative/nominations/
SupremeCourtNominations1789present.htm (last visited Dec. 21, 2020).
107
Ilya Shapiro, The Original Sin of Robert Bork, CATO INST. (Sep. 9, 2020),
https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/original-sin-robert-bork.
108
The same could happen to future nominees perceived as further left as the
country grows more partisan. However, to this point, there have certainly been no
confirmation hearings for a Democrat nominee to the Supreme Court handled as
egregiously as the hearings of Judges Bork, Thomas, or Kavanaugh.
109
The Political Leanings of the Supreme Court Justices, AXIOS (Jun. 1,
2019), https://www.axios.com/supreme-court-justices-ideology-52ed3cad-fcff-4
467-a336-8bec2e6e36d4.html; Ethan Bronner, A Conservative Whose Supreme
Court Bid Set the Senate Afire, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/20/us/robert-h-bork-conservative-jurist-dies-at-85.html; but
see Grace Panetta, Here’s What Happened the Last Time a Supreme Court Nominee was Accused of Sexual Misconduct, and How it Compares to Now, BUS.
INSIDER (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.businessinsider.com/anita-hill-christineblasey-ford-comparison-brett-kavanaugh-clarence-thomas-2018-9 (describing
the allegations of sexual misconduct at the center of the hearings of Justices
Thomas and Kavanaugh).
110
Victoria Nourse, Textualism 3.0: Statutory Interpretation After Justice
Scalia, 70 ALA. L. REV. 667, 668 (2019).
111
See Simon Lazarus, The Dishonesty of Amy Coney Barrett’s “Textualist”
Pose, NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 16, 2020), https://newrepublic.com/article/159810/
amy-coney-barrett-obamacare.

2022]

TEXTUALISM TODAY

879

Senators in past hearings have been over Constitutional questions.
Interestingly, in the case of Justice Barrett, opposition to her textualist philosophy drove sitting Senators to bring in pictures of sick
children to use as tools to suggest that a vote to confirm Judge Barrett was the equivalent of voting against the child’s health. 112 What
is the nexus between textualism and conservatism, and why is it so
uniquely controversial in the field of judicial philosophy? After all,
one is hard-pressed to find any example of an intentionalist facing
similar scrutiny.
Before further discussion, it would be important to define the
word “conservative.” As referred to in this paper, the word conservative is used to describe political conservatism and the general
preference for small government. This idea is often associated with
the Republican party and in fact, all of the so called “conservative”
Justices in the Supreme Court’s recent history were appointed by
Republican Presidents. 113 The issue becomes whether textualism in
and of itself is a conservative methodology or whether it just so happens that conservative judges have chosen to adopt it.
The most common theory as to why textualism and conservatism
are so closely linked is that textualism tends to narrow statutes and
acts to limit the reach of government authority. 114 Critics have argued that textualism has an inherent anti-regulatory bias, and that
confining a judge’s analysis strictly to the text “means that the statute will only apply in those instances that Congress explicitly passes

See Robin Givhan, Supreme Court Nominee Amy Coney Barrett has Seven
Kids. And Don’t you Dare Forget it, WASH. POST (Oct. 12, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/10/12/supreme-court-nomineeamy-coney-barrett-has-seven-kids-dont-you-dare-forget-it/; Senator Richard Blumenthal (@SenBlumenthal), Twitter (Oct. 12, 2020, 11:46AM), https://twitter.com/SenBlumenthal/status/1315680214274453508?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7
Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1315680214274453508%7Ctwgr%5
E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.courant.com%2Fpolitic
s%2Fhc-pol-blumenthal-obamacare-barrett-hearings-20201012-sh57h72mlngqr
h2akcmtvp77xu-story.html.
113
UNITED STATES SENATE, supra note 106 (Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch,
Kavanaugh, and Barrett were all appointed by Republican Presidents).
114
Lemos, supra note 21, at 849.
112
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upon.” 115 In fact, the most famous in this line of critiques is distinguished scholar and federal appellate Judge Richard Posner: 116
A legislature is thwarted when a judge refuses to apply its handiwork to an unforeseen situation that is
encompassed by the statute’s aim but is not a good
fit with its text. Ignoring the limitations of foresight,
and also the fact that a statute is a collective product
that often leaves many questions of interpretation to
be answered by the courts because the legislators
cannot agree on the answers, the textual originalist
demands that the legislature think through myriad
hypothetical scenarios and provide for all of them explicitly rather than rely on courts to be sensible. In
this way, textualism hobbles legislation-and thereby
tilts toward “small government” and away from “big
government,” which in modern America is a conservative preference. 117
This suggests that it is not the judge but the methodology itself
that naturally produces conservative outcomes. 118 Does this stand to
reason? It seems it would depend on the statute at issue and the underlying policy goals it sought to achieve. 119 Consider City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, in which Justice Scalia gave
the term “hazardous waste” a broader reading which included toxic
ash generated by an energy facility. 120 He did so over the objections
Steven R. Greenberger, Civil Rights and the Politics of Statutory Interpretation, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 37, 68 (1991).
116
Richard A. Posner, The Incoherence of Antonin Scalia, NEW REPUBLIC
(Sept. 13, 2012), https://newrepublic.com/article/106441/scalia-garner-readingthe-law-textual-originalism.
117
Id.
118
See Id.
119
See Lemos, supra note 21, at 865–66.
120
City of Chicago v. Env’t Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 334–335 (1994). This
case used a very technical and text centered reading of the statute had the effect
of extending the statute’s reach. See id. “The provision quite clearly does not contain any exclusion for the ash itself. Indeed, the waste the facility produces (as
opposed to that which it receives) is not even mentioned. There is thus no express
support for petitioners’ claim of a waste-stream exemption.” Id. (alteration in original).
115

2022]

TEXTUALISM TODAY

881

of his dissenting colleagues who argued that the legislative history
indicated that Congress did not intend for the statute to extend to a
facility of that sort. 121 In this case, the textualist philosophy gave the
statute a wider scope and extended the reach of government regulation in the area of environmental protection where conservatives
generally prefer less regulation. 122 To the same extent, consider once
again the case of Holy Trinity. 123 The Court’s purposivist analysis
led to a narrowing of the statute to not reach members of the
clergy. 124 Scalia himself said that his textualist philosophy would
have done the opposite. 125 Again, textualism would have extended
the reach of government and in that case to prohibit the importation
of a religious leader. 126 It seems unlikely that a traditional small government conservative would be fond of a regulation that has the effect of restricting a church’s ability to choose its leaders. 127 In conclusion, Judge Posner’s explanation for textualism’s association
with political conservatives does not tell the full story.
Though the previous section went into some detail about how
textualism came to be and what it was a reaction to, the focus centered more on the role of a judge in the American Constitutional
system and not on why conservatives would prefer textualism over
the other competing methods. To truly understand why textualism is
associated with conservatism, it is important to understand its political origins. In 1953, Earl Warren became the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court and held that position until 1969. 128 Many perceived
the Court to have moved in a very liberal direction throughout this
period. 129 Then came Chief Justice Warren Burger in 1969 who
Id. at 343–45 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See Haley Davie, More Republicans say Stricter Environmental Regulations are ‘Worth the Cost,’ PEW (Feb. 7, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.
org/fact-tank/2019/02/07/more-republicans-say-stricter-environmental-regulations-are-worth-the-cost/.
123
Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
124
Id. at 472.
125
SCALIA, supra note 61, at 20.
126
See Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 459.
127
See generally, Religious Freedom, HERITAGE FOUND. (Dec. 1, 2018),
https://www.heritage.org/religious-freedom.
128
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, https://www.supreme
court.gov/(last visited Feb. 3, 2021).
129
Russell W. Galloway Jr., The Third Period of the Warren Court: Liberal
Dominance (1962–69), 20 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 773 (1980) (An empirical piece
121
122
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served until 1986. 130 Although appointed by a Republican,131
Burger was not viewed as a particularly conservative Justice. 132
While he served as Chief Justice, the Court handed down many controversial cases that were perceived as being left leaning, 133 with the
decisions requiring interpretation of a statute often relying on an

that measured voting records to come to the conclusion that “liberal activists exercised almost complete control over the Court’s decisions.”).
130
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 128.
131
Id. Chief Justice Burger was appointed by President Richard Nixon. Id.
132
Warren E. Burger, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Warren-E-Burger (last visited Dec. 21, 2020) (“Contrary to some popular expectations, Burger and his three fellow Nixon appointed justices did not try
to reverse the ride of activist decision making on civil-rights issues and criminal
law that was the Warren court’s chief legacy.”); See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
207 (1973) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (Burger concurred with the majority opinion that created a Constitutional right to abortion under the controversial doctrine
of substantive due process).
133
Warren E. Burger, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/justices/warren_e_burger
(last visited Dec. 21, 2020). “Although Burger was a lifelong Republican, many
of the landmark decisions issued during his tenure represented clear liberal victories. For example, in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of Education
(1971), the Court issued a unanimous ruling supporting busing as a pragmatic
approach to reduce de facto racial segregation in schools.” Id. It is important to
note that many of the controversial decisions during this era were constitutional
ones. See id. Although not exactly the same, cases involving the doctrine of substantive due process and the living constitution approach were perceived as judicial overreach in the same way by conservatives as intentionalist statutory decisions. See Starr, supra note 56, at 378.
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intentionalist approach. 134 At the heart of several of these decisions
was the reliance on legislative history. 135
A prime example of intentionalism in action during the Burger
Court is United Steelworkers of America v. Weber. 136 This 1979 Supreme Court case involved the contested political issue of affirmative action. 137 Because the issue breaks down along party lines, 138
the case is particularly insightful and may act as an illustration of
the broader point about the direction the Court was perceived to have
gone. The case involved a manufacturing company and a union who
had entered into a collective bargaining agreement that included an
affirmative action plan with the goal of increasing racial diversity in
certain departments of the company, namely craftworkers. 139 At a
plant in Louisiana, thirty-nine percent of the employees were black,
yet less than two percent of all craftworkers were black. 140 To set
this affirmative action plan into motion, the plant established a training program whereby employees were trained to become craftworkers, and half of all openings in the program were designated for

134
See, e.g., Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 586 (1983).
In this case, a private university had its tax-exempt status taken away over racially
discriminatory admissions standards it contended served a religious purpose. Id.
Many conservatives viewed this as judicial activism and inappropriate interference with regard to religious freedom. See Eskridge, supra note 12, at 344. Chief
Justice Burger, writing for the majority, said “a court should go beyond the literal
language of a statute if reliance on that language would defeat the plain purpose
of the statute . . . .” Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 586. He then went on to write about
congressional purposes and cite legislative history in an attempt to discern the
congressional intent. Id. at 586. Justice Rehnquist dissented. Id. at 591 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting). After noting his own abhorrence for racial discrimination,
Rehnquist said “regardless of our view on the propriety of Congress’ failure to
legislate we are not constitutionally empowered to act for them . . . for there is
nothing in the language of §501(c)(3) that supports the result obtained by the
court.” Id.
135
See Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 586; see also United Steelworkers of Am. v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 199 (1979).
136
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
137
Id.
138
Race, Immigration, and Discrimination, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, (Oct. 5,
2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2017/10/05/4-race-immigrationand-discrimination/.
139
Weber, 443 U.S. at 193, 198–99.
140
Id.
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black workers. 141 The controversy arose when a white employee
who did not gain admission into the program complained that he and
others were denied access into the program despite having more seniority than even the most senior black employee in the program. 142
The white employee, Brian Weber, sued the company and the
labor union for violating Title VII’s prohibition on discrimination
on the basis of race. 143 After winning in the lower courts, the Supreme Court took up the issue. 144 Writing for the majority, Justice
Brennan cited Holy Trinity and held that although the act was within
the letter of the statute it was not within its spirit. 145 He emphasized
that the statute must be read against the background of the legislative
history. 146 In doing so, Justice Brennan reached the conclusion that
construing the statute to forbid race-conscious affirmative action
programs would “bring about an end completely at variance with the
purpose of the statute.” 147 Political conservatives were no doubt enraged by this decision, 148 and Ronald Reagan’s Justice Department
adopted a policy soon after that set out to eliminate all racial preferences, no doubt in response to Weber. 149 At the center of this decision and others was a purpose and intent based approach.
141

Id.
Id.
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
Id. at 201–02 (citing Holy Trinity).
146
Id.
147
Id. Note again that in this case, the majority approach relying on extensive
legislative history actually led to the government upholding a private agreement
between two parties, whereas a textualist approach would have given the statute
a wider scope and would have prohibited the practice, interfering with a conservative sacrament, the freedom to contract; See Conservative and Libertarian Legal
Scholarship: Contracts, FED. SOC. (Jun. 19, 2014), https://fedsoc.org/commentary/publications/conservative-libertarian-legal-scholarship-contracts (Thus, it
does not necessarily follow that textualism will lead to a conservative outcome or
less government).
148
See PEW RESEARCH CENTER, supra note 138.
149
Sophia Z. Lee, A Revolution at War with Itself? Preserving Employment
Preferences from Weber to Ricci, 123 YALE L.J. 2964, 2985–86 (2014) (stating
that Reagan swore to eliminate these programs and appointed others in the executive branch who shared his view, including William Bradford Reynolds to the
head of the Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division.). See also Johnson v.
Transp. Agency of Santa Clara Cnty., 480 U.S. 616, 673 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (in which Justice Scalia himself criticized Weber, stating “Third,
142
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Although Weber is just one example, it is against this backdrop
that the new textualism grew. The intentionalist approach was used
time and time again throughout the 1970’s and early 1980’s to reach
conclusions that were seen as far-reaching and politically left.150
Although championed by conservatives in the wake of these cases,
textualism was actually presented as a way to separate law and politics by curbing judicial activism, as it still is today. 151 Its proponents
argue that the approach is more methodical than others, with the law
leading a judge to a particular conclusion regardless of his or her
own policy preferences on the matter. 152 In fact, Justice Scalia himself once said, “The judge who always likes the results he reaches is
a bad judge.” 153 Although textualism as a methodology may be politically neutral, it was surely marketed in the 1980’s and thereafter
as a conservative alternative to avoid results like those in Weber. 154
In fact, textualism and judicial restraint were a part of the Republican party platform in every year but one between 1984 and 2013,
Weber . . . has provided little guidance . . . beyond the proposition that Title VII
does not mean what it says. Weber should be overruled.”).
150
See discussion, infra Part II. It is once again important to draw the distinction between statutory and constitutional cases. However, although constitutional
cases do not involve the use of legislative history, the abstract purpose-driven
analysis was used in many cases to reach results perceived as left-leaning. See
Lemos, supra note 21, at 891. It was this that drove conservatives to want to establish some constraint on judges, which textualism allowed them to do. Id at 886.
151
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 17, at 16–17.
152
Id.
153
Katie Glueck, Scalia: The Constitution is ‘dead’, POLITICO (JAN. 29, 2013,
8:26 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2013/01/scalia-the-constitution-isdead-086853; see also Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Neil M.
Gorsuch to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States,
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 115-208 (2017) (statement of
Hon. Neil M. Gorsuch, “for a judge who likes every outcome he reaches is probably a pretty bad judge, stretching for policy results he prefers rather than those
the law compels.”); Read Amy Coney Barrett’s opening statement to the Senate
Judiciary Committee, WASH. POST (OCT. 11, 2020, 10:12 AM), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/context/read-amy-coney-barrett-s-opening-statement-tothe-senate-judiciary-committee/cf9813f9-0fb5-4e00-a736-9763c5ae2042/
(Where then Judge Barrett touted a similar mantra: “A judge must apply the laws
as written, not as the judge wishes it were . . . .In every case, I have . . . done my
utmost to reach the result required by the law, whatever my own preferences might
be.”).
154
Lemos, supra note 21, at 895–97.
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and remains so today. 155 Moreover, textualism gave conservatives a
feeling of enhanced credibility in arguing that such cases were
wrongly decided, citing the text of the statute and the role of a judge
more generally as their justification rather than their own subjective
preferences. 156
With the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980, Republicans gained
control of the mechanism for stacking the judiciary. Wishing to
avoid outcomes like the one in Weber, Reagan began to nominate
textualist judges, including Kenneth Starr, Frank Easterbrook, and
Antonin Scalia. 157 As these judges were already personally viewed
as political conservatives before their appointments, any textualist
conclusion they reached in a case which tended to favor Republicans, seemed to re-enforce the growing perception that the philosophy was a right-leaning one. 158
In conclusion, textualism’s association with the political right
does not seem to be due to, or at least fully explained by, its inherent
qualities. In fact, the empirical evidence to show that it reliably produces conservative outcomes is scant at best. 159 The association
likely has more to do with the historical circumstances surrounding
its rise to popularity, as well as the fact that it is often conservative
judges who choose to employ it in the first place. 160 Although it may
provide a great deal of judicial restraint when followed properly,
textualism is not a perfect step-by-step process and does leave room
for a conservative judge to insert his or her own preferences into the
155

Id.
See id at 901.
157
Biographical Directory of Article III Federal Judges, 1789-present, FED.
JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/search/advanced-search (last visited Dec. 22, 2020).
158
See Lemos, supra note 21, at 901.
159
See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Liberal Justices’ Reliance on Legislative History: Principle, Strategy, and the Scalia Effect, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP.
& LAB. L. 117, 117 (2008) (finding that the use of legislative history in employment law cases led to more pro-employer results than decisions using textualism);
see also David S. Law & David Zaring, Law Versus Ideology: The Supreme Court
and the Use of Legislative History, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1653, 1726–27
(2010) (measuring not only citations to legislative history, but also to whether the
case was cited it positively, finding “no statistically significant relationship between whether an opinion cited legislative history and whether the opinion arrived
at a liberal or conservative result”).
160
See Lemos, supra note 21, at 849–50, 862–63.
156
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statute. 161 Whatever the actual reason for the broad conservative
preference of textualism, the Republican party’s open support for it
along with the fact that Republican Presidents have nominated the
bulk of the judges who purport to employ it, has left little room for
argument about whether or not textualism is perceived as right-leaning. Part IV will examine the actual data to see if perception matches
reality in the federal appellate courts today.
II.

HYPOTHESES

A.
Scalia’s Continuing Legacy
My first hypothesis regarding Justice Scalia’s ongoing influence
at the federal appellate court level is that it is just as strong now as
it was at the time of his death. Studies have shown that the interpretation methods used by the Supreme Court have a measurable impact on the methods courts of appeals choose. 162 As the Supreme
Court moves in one direction, lower courts tend to follow along.163
These studies show that the D.C. Circuit tends to follow the Supreme Court most closely, though this could be due in part to the
circuit handling more cases that deal with administrative law and
other issues of statutory interpretation more generally. 164
This phenomenon may be explained at least in part by lower
court judges keeping a close eye on the Supreme Court in an attempt
to be aware of what may be persuasive should one of their own cases
reach the Supreme Court. 165 It has often been said that judges despise being reversed on appeal. 166 This may account for some of the
trend. Another suggestion is that the impact of a Justice’s judicial
SCALIA, supra note 61, at 29.
See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Communicating the Canons: How Lower
Courts React When the Supreme Court Changes the Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 100 MINN. L. REV. 481, 483, 540–41 (2015); Glenn Bridgman, One of
These Things Is Not Like the Others: Legislative History in the U.S. Courts of
Appeal, YALE STUDENT PRIZE PAPERS 1 (2012).
163
Id. at 540–41.
164
See Bridgman, supra note 162, at 25–26.
165
See Joseph L. Smith, Patterns and Consequences of Judicial Reversals:
Theoretical Considerations and Data from a District Court, 27 JUST. SYS. J. 28
(2006).
166
Id. at 28.
161
162
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philosophy is likely to become most evident in later generations, due
to the example the Justice may set for younger attorneys who learn
about the philosophy before they have fully formulated their own
views of proper jurisprudence. 167 Though this observed trend in
which lower courts follow the example of the Supreme Court may
represent correlation, it has not been significant enough to represent
any causal connection. 168 There is no methodological stare decisis
in the federal court system and each judge is free to use legislative
history in the manner that he or she finds appropriate. 169
Having noted Justice Scalia’s impact in the field of statutory interpretation earlier in this article, it is no surprise that courts of appeals have trended toward his rejection of legislative history over
the past thirty years. 170 In support of the hypothesis that this trend
has continued, note that at the time of Justice Scalia’s passing there
were only three textualists remaining on the Court. 171 This number
has now grown to six.172 All three newly appointed Justices are selfproclaimed textualists and have each suggested that they have great
admiration for Justice Scalia. 173 Although each may differ their level
Benjamin & Renberg, supra note 2, at 1055.
See Bruhl, supra note 162, at 526.
169
See Lemos, supra note 21, at 856, 905 (noting that one state, Oregon, has
adopted a methodological stare decisis whereby the methodological framework
of the state supreme court has been treated as binding precedent).
170
See Frank B. Cross, The Theory and Practice of Statutory Interpretation
188–89 (2008).
171
The remaining textualists on the Court were Justices Thomas, Alito, and
Chief Justice Roberts. See Supreme Court of the United States, supra note 126.
172
Since Scalia’s passing, the Court’s three new members, Justices’ Gorsuch,
Kavanaugh, and Barrett all are considered textualists.
173
See Here’s Judge Gorsuch’s Full Opening Statement, NBC NEWS,
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/here-s-judge-gorsuch-s-full-openingstatement-n735961 (Mar. 20, 2017). Gorsuch said “Scalia was a mentor too. He
reminded us that words matter–that the judge’s job is to follow the words that are
in the law–not replace them with words that aren’t.” Id.; see also Trump’s Supreme Court Pick Calls Antonin Scalia a Role Model and a Judicial Hero, CNN
POLITICS, https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/13/politics/brett-kavanaugh-antoninscalia-role-model-supreme-court/index.html (Aug. 13, 2018) (Kavanaugh calling
Scalia’s philosophy “simple but profound”); Antonin Scalia’s Legacy Looms over
the Amy Coney Barrett Hearings, CNN POLITICS, https://www.cnn.
com/2020/10/12/politics/scalia-barrett-supreme-court-hearing/index.html (Oct.
13, 2020) (Barret said “It was the content of Justice Scalia’s reasoning that shaped
me . . . .A judge must apply the law as written, not as the judge wishes it were.”).
167
168
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of disdain for the use of legislative history, the current textualist
dominance of the Supreme Court is likely to have an ongoing impact
on the federal courts of appeals. 174 Further, when President Obama
left office, he left an unusual number of vacancies open on the federal courts; those seats were been filled by a Republican President,
Donald Trump. 175 Assuming that Republican appointees are more
likely to employ textualism, this militates in the direction of an observable continuing influence. In fact, former President Trump has
been praised by conservative leaders and media outlets on multiple
occasions for appointing textualists to the bench. 176 Many of his
nominees are members of the conservative Federalist Society. 177
This would seem to have an obvious impact on textualism’s continued use at the federal appellate court level in a manner consistent
with continuing influence of the late Justice.
B.
The Variance of Textualism by Appointing President
The initial expectation with regard to how the use of textualism
is likely to break down by presidential appointee is that Republicanappointed judges as a whole are more likely than their Democratappointed counterparts to reject legislative history. If the conventional wisdom that suggests close ties between textualism and conservatism is correct, the data is likely to reflect this connection. If
the perception is that conservatism is closely associated with textualism, it would follow that the more conservative the President, the
See Cross, supra note 170, at 188.
See Matt Gregory, Verify: President Obama Didn’t Leave 128 Federal
Judge Vacancies, But It was Still a Large Number, WUSA9, https://www.
wusa9.com/article/news/verify/president-trump-obama-federal-judge-vacanciesverify/65-86c98010-7fc4-4bd7-a356-0de7e137c0c4 (Oct. 16, 2020) (There were
112 vacancies when President Trump took office compared to just 53 for President Obama).
176
See Deanna Paul, Keep Those Judges Coming: Conservatives Praise
Trump’s Success in Filling the Courts, WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/11/16/keep-those-judges-coming-conservatives-praise
-trumps-success-filling-courts/ (Nov. 16, 2018) (noting that many of Trump’s
nominees are members of the Federalist Society, an organization that advocates
textualism); see Mitch McConnell, https://www.republicanleader.senate.gov/newsroom/research/200-judges (Jun. 24, 2020) (calling Trump’s nominees a victory for the rule of law).
177
Id. (“83 percent of Trump’s nominees confirmed as circuit judges are members of the Federalist Society”).
174
175
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more likely he would be to have chosen judges that employ textualism in their approach to statutory interpretation. There is a strong
public perception, and some data to back it up, that former President
Trump has appointed very conservative judges to the federal
courts. 178 As mentioned earlier, he has been often praised by the
right-wing for doing so. 179
Although it is very difficult to find data or consensus regarding
how conservative or liberal each recent President himself has been,
there is one study that sheds light on how conservative or liberal
their judicial nominees are. 180 The study used public campaign contribution records that reveal which political candidates and parties
each judge gave to prior to his or her appointment. 181 Though the
study only rated judges who had been nominated as of January 2019,
its findings were consistent with the hypothesis. 182 Further, it is
seemingly the only relevant study that has been conducted in this
area. This study found that President Trump’s appointees have been
the most conservative of any President in modern American history. 183 As for the other Presidents, it found that President Obama’s
appointments were the farthest left, President Clinton and George
H.W. Bush’s more moderate, with Ronald Reagan and George W.
Bush’s farther right. 184 Once again, insofar as conservatism is related to textualism, the results of judicial use of legislative history
are expected to come out somewhat similarly. The empirical analysis of Part IV will act to test this theory.

See generally Tom McCarthy, Trump’s Judges: A Revolution to Create a
New Conservative America, GUARDIAN, (Apr. 28, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/apr/28/donald-trump-judges-create-new-conservativeamerica-republicans; Green, supra note 26.
179
See Paul, supra note 176.
180
Green, supra note 26. (noting that this study only measured judicial appointments as of October 2018, and was done by an organization advocating for
the expansion of the number of Supreme Court Justices).
181
Id.
182
Id.
183
Id.
184
Id.
178
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III. DATA AND MEASURES
The opinions used were gathered from Lexis and Westlaw. To
get the sought-after data from each opinion, the advanced search
tool was used to measure citations to legislative history, many variations of possible citation formats to different forms of legislative
history were also used. This included formats from the Legal Bluebook as well as other nonstandard references. 185 For example, when
searching for a citation to the congressional record, the Bluebook
format of “Cong. Rec.” is used as well as “Congressional Record”
and “Cong. Record,” among others.
Searches performed in Lexis were replicated in Westlaw to ensure the most accurate results possible. As suggested by the Benjamin and Renberg study, these searches are done using a rather long
string-matching pattern to identify whether an opinion cites to legislative history or not. 186 If the search in Lexis yielded far different
results from the number in Westlaw, it would indicate that the search
terms did not accurately measure the number of citations to legislative history. 187 In each database, the same search terms were used
within the same date ranges, and the results were nearly identical. 188
For every search performed, the results were cross-checked in each
database to make sure all citations were recorded and that each opinion contained an actual citation to legislative history. 189 As in the
study by Benjamin and Renberg, the analysis was limited to whether
there was a citation to legislative history or not. 190 The actual frequency within each opinion was not measured. This is the appropriate metric because the textualism of Justice Scalia’s clear distinguishing factor was his rejection of legislative history, so the proper
See THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION (20th ed. 2020). Although every form, both standard and nonstandard, was used to search for references to legislative history in a given opinion, as the Benjamin and Renberg study
noted as well, there cannot be complete confidence that this captured all of the
possible citations to legislative history within the data set.
186
Benjamin & Renberg, supra note 2, at 1060.
187
Id at 1059.
188
In more than 300 searches, no search produced results that differed by more
than ten opinions.
189
Every search was fully compared in Westlaw and in Lexis and any variances were accounted for. Every citation to legislative history was inspected to
ensure that no false positives were recorded.
190
Benjamin & Renberg, supra note 2, at 1059-60.
185
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line is between citation and non-citation. 191 Therefore, if a judge
cites legislative history, he is not following Scalia’s approach. 192
Additionally, measuring citation versus non-citation prevents the
data from being skewed due to some opinions containing several
citations to legislative history within them. 193
The first hypothesis regarding the ongoing influence of Justice
Scalia is tested using a data set of all reported federal appellate court
opinions between June 1, 2011, and November 30, 2020. This is
broken down by circuit and represented in the charts below. 194 The
second hypothesis is measured in a similar manner as the first. However, only opinions between December 1, 2017, and November 30,
2020, are used. This was done to account for judges appointed more
recently by President Trump and thus give a more accurate picture
of how often each Presidential cohort is currently citing legislative
history. First, the Federal Judicial Center was used to gather the
names of judges and to document the President who appointed each
of them. 195 Then, having broken down all of the appellate judges by
President, individual searches of each judge were done in Lexis and
Westlaw using the same search terms for legislative history as for
the first hypothesis. The number of citations were measured both as
a raw number and as a percentage of the total. To provide context,
and to make an educated guess about the future, the makeup of the
federal appellate circuits as a whole is represented as well in a chart
showing the percentages of appointees of the various Presidents.
Table 1 outlines the search terms used to search for reported
opinions that cite to the various forms of legislative history. 196

Eskridge, supra note 3, at 623–24.
Benjamin & Renberg, supra note 2, at 1059.
193
Id.
194
See infra Part V.
195
FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/search/advancedsearch (last visited Dec. 22, 2020).
196
Many of the search terms used are the same as the ones used in the study
done by Benjamin and Renberg. That study had compiled a long list of possible
citations and different variations and it was advantageous to use many of the same
terms to pick up the greatest number of citations. However, they did not include
the citations to resolutions or documents, and this Article covers a more recent
time frame than that study.
191
192
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TABLE 1: SEARCHES OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY WITHIN REPORTED
FEDERAL APPELLATE MAJORITY OPINIONS
Search Terms
“H.R.J.” OR “H. Comm.” OR “Cong. Rec.” OR “S. Comm.”
OR “H.R. Res.” OR “House Res.” OR “S.REP” OR “Sen. Res.”
OR “H.R. Con. Res.” OR “S. Con. Res.” OR “H.R.J. Res.” OR
“S.J. Res.” OR “S. Exec. Res.” OR “H.R.Doc. No.” OR “H.R.
Misc. Doc. No.” OR “S. Doc. No.” OR “S. Exec. Doc. No.” OR
“S. Treaty Doc. No.” OR “S. treaty doc. no.” OR “S. treaty” OR
“H.R. Rep. No.” OR “H.R.REP” OR “cong. rec” OR “congressional rec” OR “cong. record” OR “cong. globe” OR “statement
of rep” OR “statement by Rep” OR “statement of sen” OR “statement by sen” OR “statement of chair” OR “statement by chair”
OR “statement of hon” OR “statement by hon” OR “statement of
representative” OR “statement by representative” OR “statement
of senator” OR “statement by senator” OR “statement of honorable” OR “statement by honorable” OR “remarks of rep” OR “remarks by Rep” OR “remarks of sen” OR “remarks by sen” OR
“remarks of chair” OR “remarks by chair” OR “remarks of hon”
OR “remarks by hon” OR “remarks of representative” OR “remarks by representative” OR “remarks of senator” OR “remarks
by senator” OR “remarks of honorable” OR “remarks by honorable” OR “comments of rep” OR “comments by Rep” OR “comments of sen” OR “comments by sen” OR “comments of chair”
OR “comments by chair” OR “comments of hon” OR “comments
by hon” OR “comments of representative” OR “comments by representative” OR “comments of senator” OR “comments by senator” OR “comments of honorable” OR “comments by honorable”
OR “hearing before the committee” OR “hearing before the
comm” OR “hearing before the subcommittee” OR “hearing before the subcomm” OR “hearing on h.r” OR “hearing on s.” OR
“hearing before the h” OR “comm. hearing” OR “hearing before
the s” OR “comm. hearing” OR “conf. rep” OR “conf. report” OR
“h.r. rep” OR “s. rep” OR “h. rep” OR “conference rep” OR “senate rep” OR “house rep” OR “h.r. report” OR “committee report”
OR “committee rep” OR “comm. rep” OR “comm. report” OR
“subcommittee rep” OR “subcommittee report” OR “subcomm.
rep.” OR “subcomm. report”
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IV. RESULTS
A. Continuing Influence by Circuit

Figure 1: First through Fifth Circuit
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Figure 2: Sixth through Ninth Circuit
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Figure 3: The Tenth, Eleventh, D.C. and Federal
Circuits
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The results gathered from the various circuits confirmed the initial first hypothesis. 197 In all but two of the thirteen circuits,
197

See discussion supra Part II.
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citations to legislative history went down, and in some cases dramatically. Figure Two above shows that the Seventh and Eighth Circuits nearly cut the number of citations in half. The initial hypothesis
stated that even a slight decrease in citations to legislative history
among the courts would indicate ongoing influence. The fact that
citations went down as a whole indicate that the influence is very
strong, and that textualism will be around for many years to come.
Intriguingly, although the increase in citations was very small,
the Tenth Circuit is composed of only a third of Democrat appointees, 198 who are more likely to cite to legislative history than their
Republican counterparts. The Ninth Circuit, although widely seen
as the most politically left of all the circuits, 199 saw a slight decrease
as well. 200 This could be due to the addition of ten new Trump appointees. 201 As a whole, most of the circuits showed stability in the
willingness to cite legislative history during the two periods. The
slight overall decline among the circuits is likely best explained by
the vacancies that were left open by the Obama Administration,202
as well as the retirement of some older judges and the subsequent
addition of many new Trump appointees who, as shown in Figure
Five, are the least likely of all cohorts to cite to legislative history.203

See FED. JUD. CTR., supra note 195.
Circuit Court Map, VISUAL FIRST AMENDMENT, http://visualfa.org/circuitcourt-map/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2022). This website ranks the circuits from most
conservative to most liberal based on quantitative and qualitative factors associated with rulings on the First Amendment. Id. The ninth circuit is by far regarded
as the most liberal. Id.
200
The reason for such high numbers of citations in the Ninth Circuit is not
explained fully by it being perceived as left-wing. It handles the most cases of all
circuits and the charts above show only raw numbers of citations.
201
FED. JUD. CTR., supra note 195.
202
See Matt Gregory, supra note 175.
203
See Figure Five.
198
199
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B.

Citations by Presidential Cohort

Figure 4: Citations by Presidential Cohort
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The data shows a clear ideological correlation between the party
of the appointing president and the use of textualism. Whatever the
initial reasons for its association with the Republican party and
whether it reliably produces conservative outcomes, in today’s federal appellate courts the willingness to cite legislative history follows obvious party-lines.
The data gathered on the variance in citation frequency based on
appointing President both confirms in part and denies in part the
second hypothesis. Republican appointees as a whole are statistically less likely to rely on legislative history than their Democrat
counterparts, 204 but the predictions with regard to how it would
breakdown by President were slightly off. As Figure Four shows
above, Trump appointees were the least likely to cite legislative history by a rather significant margin—more than three percent less
likely than the next cohort. 205 However, the data disproved the hypothesis that Obama appointees would be the most likely to cite legislative history. Clinton appointees were roughly three percent more
likely than Obama appointees to cite it.
The unexpected result could possibly be explained by a theory
mentioned earlier in this Article. The Benjamin and Renberg study
posited that a judge’s influence may be felt most strongly in the next
generation of judges because those judges were able to read the
judge’s opinions while still in law school and before developing
See Figure 4, supra Part IV.
Three percent sounds like a very small margin, but the highest percentage
being only thirteen and a half, it is substantial.
204
205
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their own views of statutory interpretation. 206 This would account
for the fact that Obama appointees, although further left politically
according to the one study, 207 were less likely to cite to legislative
history than Clinton appointees. In fact, Obama appointees were
marginally closer to the Reagan and H.W. Bush appointees. 208 This
makes sense considering that Clinton appointees are closer in age to
Scalia and most were already practicing attorneys or judges by the
time Scalia ascended to the Supreme Court. Further, although Republican appointees as a whole were less likely to cite to legislative
history, the two most recent Republican Presidential cohorts were
less likely to do so than their predecessors. The most recent cohort,
those appointed by President Trump, was far less likely to cite legislative history. The judges appointed more recently may have been
just as liberal or conservative as the cohorts in the past, but the profession as a whole moved in the direction of textualism.
C.

What This Means Going Forward

Figure 5: Current Makeup of Federal Appellate Courts
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Although not broken down by individual circuit, the chart above
shows the current makeup of the federal appellate courts by Presidential cohort. 209 At present, Trump appointees make up a razor-thin
206
207
208
209

Benjamin & Renberg, supra note 2, at 1055.
See Green, supra note 26.
See Figure 4, supra Part IV.
See Figure 5, supra Part IV.
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plurality that is likely to grow in the coming years as older judges
retire. 210 Given that Trump appointees were the least likely to cite
legislative history, 211 appellate courts will likely continue to have a
strong textualist presence in the coming years. However, roughly
twenty-five percent of the total seats are currently held by the more
textualist Reagan and H.W. Bush judges.212 Therefore, many of the
vacancies that will likely open up over the next four years will be
from those cohorts. If these seats are filled by more liberal judges,
there may actually be an observable change in the opposite direction
with courts being more willing to cite legislative history going forward. Still, if the next cohort of Democrat-appointed judges follow
in the Obama cohort’s footsteps, and are more textualist than their
predecessor, the change may not be significant. 213 Although its
long-term popularity is uncertain, with the presence of a large number of Bush and Trump appointees likely to continue serving for
some time, it is clear that textualism will not “recede in influence”
anytime soon. 214
V.
CONCLUSION
“If you would not be forgotten as soon as you’re dead, either
write something worth reading or do something worth writing.”215
In his lifetime, Scalia did both. Although often controversial, it cannot be denied that Scalia left an impact few other judges will. 216 Justice Kagan herself noted that a century from now when many other
Justices are forgotten, Scalia will live on. 217 The data shows that
President Biden may very well appoint a significant number of judges during his time in office. However, the weight of those appointments is unlikely to
be felt until a few years into his Presidency given the time it takes to confirm the
judges, and the fact that a sitting judge must retire or pass away for there to be a
vacancy.
211
See Figure 4, supra Part IV.
212
See Figure 5, supra Part IV.
213
If the next Democrat-appointed cohort were less likely to cite legislative
history than the Obama cohort, this would indicate clear Scalia influence on the
profession as a whole and not only on the right-wing.
214
Siegel, supra note 102, at 861.
215
POOR RICHARDS ALMANAC, PETER PAUPER PRESS (1988).
216
Scalia Lecture, supra note 8.
217
Id.
210
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Scalia’s textualist ideal is still closely associated with the Republican party, but as noted above, it may have crossed political lines to
some degree. 218 In the future, it would not be surprising if the popularity of textualism grows as a whole and it breaks away from the
conservative label. Most law schools teach the philosophy directly,
and Scalia’s opinions are unavoidable in course curriculums. Although only time will tell whether Scalia’s textualism remains
strong.

218

See discussion supra Part IV.

